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Plain English Abstract 
These studies are based on the assumption that when adults, adolescents or children 
identify someone as the “guilty” one, i.e., the person who committed the act, they are not 
only making an identification based on memory and thinking, but also a moral decision. 
This is because, by the act of identifying or not identifying someone, the eyewitness runs 
the risk of either convicting an innocent person , i.e., making false positive error  or 
letting a guilty person go free, i.e., a false negative error.  Our interest is less in the 
overall accuracy of their identifications and more in the balance of false positive and false 
negative errors.  We have found in these and past studies that the balance of these two 
kinds of errors changes with age, and that this pattern may also depend on (a) the child’s 
general understanding of the purpose of the task, which appears to be ‘lost’ on 7-9 year 
olds, the youngest group studied, and (b) for older children and adolescents, how the act 
is described, e.g., intended or not. In this way, we can understand that the act of 




A Moral Developmental Perspective on Children’s Eyewitness Identification: 
Does Intent Matter? 
Scientific Abstract 
In study 1 eyewitness identification of the perpetrator of a ‘crime’ (fire), framed as either 
intended or unintended, was studied in 138 children, ages 7 to 18. Analysis using Signal 
Detection reveals an interaction of age and condition on decisional bias.  Like in past 
studies, the framing of the act had no effect on the 7-9 year olds, but did have an effect on 
decisional bias for the other age groups.  Decisional bias was more lax (indicting more 
false alarms) in the intended condition for 10-12 and 14-15 year olds but was more 
stringent (fewer false alarms) for the 16-18 year olds. This pattern of age and condition 
differs from the pattern of explicit judgments (how bad the act was, how much 
punishment it deserved, and how bad it is to commit a false alarm or a miss). Study 2 was 
conducted to confirm the unexpected findings for the 10-12 year olds.  Forty-two 
children, ages 10-12 viewed the same film, which was framed as unintended, but, 
resulting either in (a) major or (b) minor damage (fire), approximately half randomly 
assigned to condition (a) and half to (b).  Parallel results were obtained with an earlier 
study, with lower bias scores (more false alarms) in the major than minor damage 
conditions. Thus, from both studies, we may conclude that decisional bias is more lenient 
(resulting in more false alarms) for 10-12 year olds when either intent or damage is bad. 
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Children’s eyewitness identification has been extensively studied from the point 
of view of memory, cognition and suggestibility (e.g., Brewer, Weber, Semmler, 2005; 
Cultice, Somerville, Wellman, 1983; Meissner, Tredoux, Parker, & MacLin, 2005).   
Research has shown that younger children tend not only to commit more errors than older 
children or adults, they especially do so (1) more when they are asked to choose from 
among alternatives (as opposed to free recall) (e.g., Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1999; Roebers, 
Moga, & Schneider, 2001; Wells & Loftus, 2003 ); (2) in particular, younger children 
make more false positive errors or false alarms with great confidence (e.g., Pozzulo & 
Lindsay, 1999; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995; Wells & Loftus, 2003; see Keast, 
Brewer, & Wells, 2007 for mixed results) , and (3) when they are even subtly pressured 
to positively identify a suspect by anyone in authority, including an interviewer (e.g., 
Ceci & Bruck, 1993, 1995; Cutler & Penrod, 1995; Muensterburg, 1908).   
However, despite the voluminous research literature, very little research has been 
done within a moral development framework, and yet a moment’s reflections makes clear 
that identifying someone accused of a crime  not only involves perception, memory and 
cognition, but also a moral decision.  For example, identifying whether someone was at a 
party you attended does not in-and-of-itself involve moral decision-making whereas 
identifying whether a person committed a crime (e.g., intentionally set a fire) does, in that 
a false identification (false alarm) risks punishing an innocent person whereas a failure to 
identify a perpetrator (a false negative or miss) involves letting a guilty person go free 
and perhaps commit another criminal act. [We should note that although most research on 
eyewitness identification does not frame the study as involving moral decisions, Malpass 
and colleagues (e.g., Malpass & Lindsay, 1999) have noted that the severity of the 
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transgression may lead to more false positives, which implies that eyewitness 
identification may yield to the cry to “justice” as in the form of punishment of the guilty 
(see discussion.] 
Our research strategy focuses on how children’s moral orientation might influence 
their decisional process when identifying a perpetrator.  In doing so, we rely both on (1) 
past research on children’s moral development, especially on the shift in moral judgment 
from early focus on the outcome of the act to later attention to intentions behind the act, 
in law the mens rea (e.g., Piaget, 1932/1965) and (2) signal detection methodology (e.g., 
Gescheider, 1985; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan, N. A., & Creelman, C. D., 2005) to 
analyze decisional bias.  The research reported here thus involves a combination of moral 
development theory, experimental method, and signal detection measurement.   
Our overarching hypothesis is that the moral framing of the event interacting with 
the developmental status of the eyewitness will affect the eyewitness identification 
process, in particular the decisional criterion used to make identifications. Our previous 
research (Spring, Saltzstein & Peach, 2012) has shown that whether the same act is 
framed as involving moral issues or not affects performance bias, particularly the 
commission of false alarms, but that the effect of the framing interacts with the age of the 
participant. The findings were that:  the ten-twelve year olds had a significantly lower 
bias score, indicating more false alarms, when the outcome (a fire) was very bad 
although unintended than when the bad outcome was minor although intended; whereas 
the youngest children, seven-to-nine, committed more false alarms regardless of 
condition, and 13-15 year olds made fewer false alarms than both groups of children in 
both conditions.   
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The unexpected lack of condition effect on the youngest age group, was 
disambiguated when their judgments of false alarms and misses as to which was the 
worst kind of error to make was assessed (see Methods). The ten-to-twelve year olds 
responded as expected; they thought misses were worse because, for example, ‘if you let 
the man go free, he might do it again’.  In contrast, the older participants generally 
thought that false alarms were worse because ‘you could send an innocent man to jail’.    
However, the youngest children (7-9) responded in ways that showed no attention to the 
moral consequences of identifying the perpetrator.  Judging from the reasons they 
offered, they did not treat the eyewitness task as a moral decision at all. Rather, they 
appeared to think of the task as a test of achievement, much as one might think of an 
academic test or sports performance, i.e., having no moral implications. Why should 
there be this shift in judgments of which is worse from false negatives (in Signal 
Detection terms, misses) to false positives (false alarms)? To provide an answer we need 
to turn first to earlier research on younger children’s moral judgments. 
Jean Piaget (1932\1965) provided evidence that younger children give great 
emphasis to the outcome of the act, especially if that outcome is material, appearing to 
ignore or give little weight to the intentions behind the act (mens rea) and more weight to 
the outcome of the act when morally judging the act.  Although there has been much 
controversy about this finding (e.g., Karniol, 1978; Keasey, 1978), the preponderance of 
evidence shows that at least under some conditions intent is either ignored or given less 
weight by younger children (e.g., Boehm, 1962; Costanzo et al. 1973; Grinder, 1964; 
Whiteman & Kosier, 1964). Also according to Piaget (1932), younger children also 
appear to believe that harsher punishment, even if arbitrary, is fairer and more effective 
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as a deterrent than a more lenient punishment.   (Unfortunately, the studies of shifts in 
moral judgment from outcome to intention have lost favor with researchers in psychology 
although, of course, intentionality remains a central concern in forensic psychology, 
especially in the centrality of the mens rea.) 
From this research literature, given our conceptualization of eyewitness 
identification as a type of moral decision and decisional bias as a type of implicit 
decision, we would expect (a) younger children to ‘over-guess’, i.e., commit more false 
alarms, (b) especially when the outcome of the act is bad. 
In the research reported here, the primary measure of moral decision is not the 
explicit judgment used by Piaget and those that followed him, but rather a more covert or 
implicit measure revealed in these younger eyewitnesses’ face identifications.  This 
distinction between explicit and implicit decisions/behaviors, of course, is well 
established in the research literature; indeed, it has become pervasive in our 
understanding of all kinds of decision-making including forensic (e.g., Greenwald & 
Krieger, 2006,). We now turn to Signal Detection Theory as a means of identifying this 
particular index of implicit decision-making. 
Signal detection analysis statistically separates the general error rate, measured 
by sensitivity (d’), and decisional bias (C), the specific tendency to commit false alarms 
(i.e., identifying an innocent person as the perpetrator) over and above what one would 
expect by chance.  It is the decisional bias on which we focus in this research since we 
believe that the decisional criterion is more reflective of the eyewitness’s moral 
orientation while general accuracy or in Signal Detection terminology, sensitivity is more 
reflective of memory and cognitive capacities and limitations. It should be noted that 
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positive bias indices indicate a prevalence of false negatives or misses whereas negative 
bias indices indicate a prevalence of false positives or false alarms, both relative to 
chance.  The usefulness of decisional bias as a measure of implicit processes is revealed 
in the different age X condition patterns that result when this measure is contrasted with 
what are clearly more explicit measures (past research and below) 
In summary, our research suggests that: (1) a moral development framework is 
useful for examining developmental changes in eyewitness identification, as measured by 
signal detection analysis; (2) children’s understanding of the task changes with age, as 
reflected in their implicit decisional strategy and their explicit answers to why false 
alarms and misses are bad; and, (3) their decisional strategy is evidenced in their 
performance specifically, decisional bias.  
Study 1 
The question to be addressed in this first study is when outcome or damage is 
specified, as it typically is in cases before the court, the intentions behind the act also 
influence decisional criteria, or are ignored. Therefore, it is the intentions of the actor 
(perpetrator) that was experimentally varied holding outcome constant, at a bad (major 
damage) level in the first study.   The questions posed were: (1) would intentions 
(malevolent vs. unintended) influence eyewitness identification performance, specifically 
decisional bias, which is reflected in the false alarm rate differently at different ages? 
And, (2) whether this variation would affect beliefs about which kind of error is worse, as 
distinguished from eyewitness performance, differently at different ages? 
Method 
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Participants. One hundred and thirty-eight participants recruited from a private 
elementary (Jewish after school) and a private (Roman Catholic) high school in New 
York State participated in a study of eyewitness identification.
1
  The participants
consisted of 25 7-9’s (12 male, 13 female, M = 7.9); 24 10-12’s (14 male, 10 female, M = 
10.9); 57 14-15’s (29 male, 28 female, M= 15.7) and 32 16-17’s (12 male, 20 female, M 
= 17.2). 
Materials and Procedures. The same filmed act of setting a fire was framed in 
two different ways: (a) as involving  an unintended act, which resulted in a fire that 
ruined the restaurant (unintended fire); and, (b) as an intended act of trying to set a fire 
that ruined the restaurant (intended fire) by means of different voice-overs. One stressed 
the unintended nature of the act and the other the bad intentions motivating the act, both 
resulting in the same bad outcome. Thus, the format of this study is 2 conditions (framing 
of film as intentional or unintentional) by 4 age groups.  
The participant's task was to choose the perpetrator, who started a fire. Each 
participant received instructions prior to viewing the sequentially presented ‘lineup’. The 
instructions were: "Now we would like you to pick the man who started the fire. He may 
or may not be in the photos." Each individual participant was then sequentially shown a 
series of photos by computer. 
The film was professionally shot at a restaurant in lower Manhattan.  All the 
actors were male, Caucasian, 5’ 11” to 6’1” in height, ages 22-24, dressed in jeans and 
crew neck sweaters.  There was no audible dialogue among the actors in either film 
version. The film lasted 127 seconds, with the perpetrator visible for the entire time.  He 
was filmed from various angles, with his face available from right profile for 90 seconds, 
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left profile for 10 seconds and full profile for 27 seconds.  The two ‘framed’ versions 
employed in the study are presented below.
Both versions begin with: "Look, there are four men at that table with a lit 
birthday cake! It must be someone's birthday. Uh oh, there is an announcement that the 
restaurant is closing. They must leave quickly. They have no time to enjoy their cake!" 
(They blow out the candles and one man throws the cake in the garbage. The candles are 
smoking.) “That guy is throwing the cake away so that they can get out of the restaurant 
quickly.” Then the text proceeds differently in the two conditions: 
A. Voice over for Film Version 1 (Neutral Intentions with Bad Outcome):  "Uh,
oh! He doesn’t see that the candles are still burning and smoking when he throws out the 
cake.”  
B. Voice over for Film Version 2 (Bad Intentions with Bad Outcome):   (same
stem) "Hey, that one guy is really angry that they can’t eat the cake. So, he throws the 
cake with the candles still burning and smoking into the garbage can. He really hopes that 
the restaurant catches on fire.   
In both the Intended and Unintended versions, the narrator adds “Oh, look, the 
garbage can catches fire and the restaurant gets ruined!" (Show smoke in the garbage can. 
Fade to black. Sirens heard.)  
Procedures. 
To check on moral judgments of the event, after viewing the film, the participants 
were first asked three questions in counter-balanced order; “How bad was the man in the 
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film?”, “How bad was what the man did in the film?”, and “How bad was what happened 
to the restaurant?”   In addition, each participant was asked what kind of punishment, if 
any, would he/she recommend:  No punishment, Community Service, a $5,000 fine, or 1-
5 years in jail.  The nature of “community service” and the idea of this being a scale of 
severity of punishment was carefully explained to the participants, especially the younger 
ones, until the experimenter (T.S.) was convinced that they understood the task.  
Following the punishment scale, the participants were given the eyewitness 
identification task.  The task was to choose the perpetrator, who either intentionally or 
unintentionally started a fire.  Each participant received the following instructions prior to 
viewing the lineup. "Now we would like you to find the man who started the fire. He may 
or may not be in the photos." Each participant was then sequentially shown a series of 
photos (by computer), which included (a) the perpetrator, (b) each of the three other men 
at the restaurant, (c) the waiter (bystander), and (d) a man, who was not in the film at all. 
The Signal Detection procedure was used by presenting the six individuals each 
presented frontally and in right and left profile. The series again consisted of three series 
of trials of the 18 photos (6 individuals by 3 angles); yielding 54 judgments in all, 
randomly ordered, with the constraint that photos of the same person were never 
presented twice in a row.  All photos were head and shoulder shots with left/right and 
frontal profiles. Lineup targets were dressed in identical dark blue t-shirts and were 
filmed against the same background.  All participants were familiarized with the 
procedure so that they were proficient in its use before the actual judgments began.  This 
required a short training procedure for the youngest participants in which they were asked 





untrue and shown how to represent each option.  It should be noted that in Signal 
Detection analysis, a higher bias score indicates fewer false alarms. 
At the end of photo-identifications, each participant was asked how bad it would 
be to say someone did it when he didn’t (a false alarm) and how bad would it be to say 
someone did not do it when he did (a miss), and why it would be bad?  These were scored 
in two ways: (1) dichotomously between those who gave a morally relevant reason, 
whether focusing on not accusing an innocent person or letting a guilty person to go free, 
versus those that gave a non-morally relevant reason, usually one that focused on the 
achievement aspect of performance without any consideration of the consequences for 
the accused or for the larger society, and (2) where -1 indicated a moral reason which 
focused on the dangers and undesirability of committing a miss, i.e., letting a guilty 
person go free, 0, a non-moral, mixed or confused reason, and +1 a moral reason focusing 
on the dangers and undesirability of sending an innocent person to jail. 
Results 
Eyewitness Performance: There was a small but significant effect of condition on 
sensitivity, F (1, 130) = 4.131, p <.05, p
2 
=.03, with sensitivity being higher in the 
Unintended fire condition, and a non-significant trend for an interaction effect of age and 
condition on sensitivity (d’) F (1, 130) = 2.24, p <.09, p
2 
=.05.   Of greater interest were 
significant effects on bias when “ very sure it is the man” was contrasted with the other 
three alternatives (C3) for condition, F(1, 137) = 4.448, p < .037, p
2
=.033  and for age, 
F(1, 137) = 5.329, p < .5.329, p < .002, p
2 
= .110, which were superseded by a 
significant interaction between age and condition, F(1, 137) = 4.49, p <.005, p
2 
= .094, 





alarms, in the Intended than in the Unintended condition at ages 10-12 and 14-15, by 
planned t-tests, whereas bias scores were significantly higher for the 16-18 year olds 
indicating fewer false alarms. As in the earlier study there was no significant effect of 
framing condition for the 7-9 year olds.   
---------------------Insert Figure 1 about here-------------------- 
Moral Judgments of the perpetrator (“how bad was the man (actor)”. When the 
participants were asked to explicitly judge the perpetrator as described in the two 
conditions, the results are still different.  Contrary to expectations, participants at all ages 
explicitly judged the bad intended perpetrator as worse than the non-intended (negligent) 
one, F (1, 137) =62.68, p<.0001, p
2 
=.325.  See Figure 2.   
----------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here------------------------- 
Recommended Punishment.  However, in sharp contrast, when asked what 
punishment would be most appropriate, the youngest (7-9 year old) children did not 
differentiate between the intended and unintended acts at all whereas the ten-to-twelve 
years old and the two adolescent groups did, as expected (Figure 3).  Treating the four 
alternatives as a 4-point scale (0-3), we found a significant effect of condition, F (1, 137) 
= 20.5, p<.0001, p
2 
= .136 and a borderline interaction effect between age and condition, 
F (1, 137) = 2.13, p< .10, p
2
 = .047. Figure 3 suggests that the condition effect might be 
greatest for the 10-12 year olds but non-existent for the 7-9 year olds, thus paralleling the 
pattern for eyewitness decision-making (bias).   
---------------------Insert Figure 3 about here-------------------- 
Concern for the innocent vs., the guilty. Here, the measure of concern for 





worse?), reveals main effects for condition, F (1, 137) = 9.68, p < .001, p
2 
=.069, but 
unlike our earlier studies age does not have a main effect, F (1, 137) = 1.119, p >.20. Nor 
is there an interaction effect, F (1, 137) = 1.49, p >.20. However, when scored according 
to whether they gave a moral reason at all, regardless of whether it was to justify 
choosing a false alarm or a miss as the worse error to make, labeled Moral Reasoning 
(Figure 4) show that, like in the previous results, moral responses to this question (i.e., 
responses which focus on either the unfairness of convicting an innocent person or of 
letting a guilty person go free) increase from the 7-9 year olds to the other three age 
groups.  F (3, 130) = 10.34, p <.0001, p
2
 = .193.   
---------------------------Insert Figure 4 about here-------------------- 
Is there any relationship between stated concerns for the innocent vs. concerns for 
letting the guilty go free and bias (C3).  A point-biserial correlation between these 
judgments and bias in performance on the task reveals a significant correlation, r = .249, 
p <.003.   This further supports our overall hypothesis although it should be noted that 
age might complicate this relationship. 
Discussion 
In the first study reported here, eyewitness identification was compared for the 
same act framed as either (a) malevolently intended or (b) unintended, both resulting in 
the same major damage.  With damage controlled, intentions had no effect on the 
decisional criterion for the 7-9 year olds; however, 10-12 and 14-15 year olds used a 
looser decisional criterion, resulting in more false alarms when intent was malevolent 
than when innocent; however, 16-18 year olds did the reverse, using a more stringent 





for bias or decisional criterion was significant only when “very sure it was the man” was 
contrasted with the other three is consistent with prior findings that younger children are 
particularly prone to erroneously decide that it ‘definitely was the person’ (e.g., Pozzulo 
& Lindsay, 1999 ) and with our  past findings. 
In the 2012 study the ten-twelve year olds used a looser decisional criterion 
(indicated by the bias score) when an unintended act resulted in major damage; however, 
in study1 here an intended act resulting in major damage also produced lower bias scores.  
Was it the intention or the outcome, which produced the lower bias scores (more false 
alarms)? Therefore, we decided to replicate the findings from the earlier study (Spring et 
al., 2012) contrasting major vs. minor damage both for an unintended act.  In the second 
study, here, two framing conditions of the same act were contrasted: both unintended but 
where one condition featured major (material) damage and the other, minor damage.  If 
the results replicate the earlier study, this would help confirm the conclusion that (a) 
whether outcome is bad (involving major material damage) but unintentional or 
intentions are bad the 10-12 year old children implicitly use a looser criterion to identify 
with certainty; however, also (b) when intent is malevolent and outcome bad, then the 10-
12 year-old children also use a looser criterion to identify the culprit.  In other words, 
whatever element stresses the “badness of the act”, whether the intentions or the outcome 
(damage), induces a looser decisional criterion and therefore more false alarms or false 
recognitions for these age groups. 
Study 2 
We collected another sample of 10-12 year olds comparing two framings: both 





damage (fire) and the other version with a major bad outcome (fire).  The purpose of this 
study was to help disambiguate the results for this age group (above). 
Method 
Participants –Forty-two 10-12 year olds were recruited from two Roman Catholic 
parochial elementary schools in New York City to participate in the study. Both parental 
consent and child assent was obtained for each participant.  The sample consisted of 
forty-two 10-to12 year olds (M = 11.29, SD =.94, 16 males & 26 females).  Most of the 
children were of African-American or Latino ethnic background and from lower SES.
2
 
Half of the participants were randomly assigned to small damage (fire) condition and half 
to the large damage (fire) condition.  
Design and Stimulus materials - The same filmed act of setting a fire was again 
framed in two different ways by means of a voice-over: as either (a) an unintentional 
wrong doing with a serious consequence (a fire that ruined the restaurant) or (b) an 
unintentional wrong doing with a minor consequence (one that only damaged the 
wastebasket but left the restaurant undamaged).  The film and procedures were the same 
as those that had been used in study 1.  Depending on the version (condition) the act 
either results in a major fire, which burns down the restaurant (very bad outcome) or a 
minor fire (not bad outcome) that just results in a little smoke. In the past study the 
actor’s intention and the outcome had been confounded by design. However, in the 
present study it was the outcome (a major vs. a minor fire) that was varied with 
intentionality controlled at the unintentional level.  Thus, the voice-over was the same as 
in the first study but with different endings in the two conditions:  
                                                 
2
  Although the SES and ethnicity of this sample is different from the sample in study 1, our past research 
has shown that while ethnicity/SES may have a general main effect on the dependent variables, it does not 





A. Voice over for Film Version 1 (Neutral Intent with not a bad outcome): “He 
doesn’t see that the candles are still burning and smoking when he throws out 
the cake.  Oh look the trash is smoldering but the restaurant did not catch fire.”  
B. Voice over for Film Version 2 (Neutral Intent with bad outcome): “He doesn’t 
see that the candles are still burning and smoking when he throws out the cake.  
Oh look the trash is smoldering and the restaurant is ruined.” 
Once the participants completed the identification portion of the task, they were 
asked how serious false alarms and misses are, in an age-appropriate manner (as 
described above).  At the end of this task, each participant was asked the same additional 
questions: how bad was (a) a false alarm and (b) a miss. Then the participant was asked 
(c) which kind of error was worse and why?   
Results 
Eyewitness Performance: There was again a significant condition effect on bias 
when “very sure it is the man” was contrasted with the other three alternatives (C3), t(41) 
= 7.795, p <.008, p
2  
=.163.   
Moral Judgments of the act (“how bad was what the man did”). When the 
participants were asked to explicitly judge the perpetrator’s act as described in the two 
conditions, the comparison was also significant, t(1, 41) = 27.16, p<.001, p
2
 = .144. 
However, there were no significant condition effects for either punishment or moral 
judgment of the perpetrator (“how bad was the man”). 
General Discussion 
What conclusions are we to draw from the findings reported here and those from 





children or adolescents when identifying a perpetrator are substantially influenced by the 
moral nature of the act and the moral orientation of the eyewitness.  Thus, in the prior 
studies, (1) whether the actor being identified committed a moral transgression or a  
morally neutral act influenced the decisional criterion implicitly used by children 10 and 
over; but unexpectedly there was no difference for the youngest children (ages 7-9). 
When the children were asked how bad a false positive and a false negative were and 
why, their reasons strongly indicated it was because the latter did not appreciate the 
decision as being moral, i.e., having consequences for others (Spring et al., study 1).                    
(2) Instructing children either of the dangers of false positives or false negatives 
has no discernible influence on the decisional criteria used although socio-economic 
class/ethnicity does, with decisional criteria being less stringent (indicated by more false 
alarms) for lower SES/minority than higher SES/majority children (Spring et al., 2012, 
Study 2). However, the demographic variable did not interact with age and condition, but 
operated as a main effect. 
(3) Eyewitnesses age 10-12 appear to use a looser decisional criterion when the 
actor unintentionally produced great damage than when the actor intentionally produced 
little damage, but the reverse was true for children age 13-15.  Again, there was no effect 
for the youngest age group studied 7-9 year olds (Spring et al., 2012, study 3).   
As to the two studies reported here: (4) in the first study, eyewitnesses 10-12 and 
13-15 appear to use a looser criterion when the intentions are malevolent than when the 
act was unintended, but resulted in a bad outcome, in the form of material damage. 
However, the reverse was true for the 16-18 year olds.  The latter finding may be because 





therefore the culpability is greater and so is the punishment and perhaps one must use 
greater caution in identifying the perpetrator.  The results for the 10-12 year olds was 
puzzling in that we had expected them to ignore intentions and therefore not use different 
decisional criteria in the two conditions. 
(5) However, in the second study, eyewitnesses 10-12 years old also used a looser 
criterion when outcome was bad even if unintended, confirming the results in the earlier 
study.  
What is the most parsimonious conclusion to be drawn from the two studies 
reported here and the prior studies, and especially the apparently contradictory results for 
the 10-12 year olds?  It is that whatever feature of the act, intention or outcome, is bad, 
will elicit a lower bias score indicating more false alarms for the 10-12 year olds. 
So it seems to be that whatever feature of the act, the intentions behind it or the 
outcome of it, is bad, decisional criteria are weakened resulting in more false alarms.  
Doesn’t this contrast what one should expect from Piaget’s early finding that young 
children emphasize outcome whereas older children emphasize intention in assigning 
blame and imposing punishment? However, some reflection indicates that this may really 
be compatible with a Piagetian explanation after all. 
What Piaget reported was a gradual shift from stressing outcome to intentions. 
However, Piaget’s (later) theory stresses structural change as key to development and the 
shift from focusing on outcome to focuses on intention involves a shift in content not 
structure.  (He sometimes even referred to his earlier theorizing as his own ‘pre-
operational’ stage.) A genuine structural shift would rather involve a change from 





to 12 years have difficulty doing this and thus whatever negative feature is prominent, it 
will implicitly lead them to use a looser criterion, thus sacrificing the possibility of 
convicting an innocent person to the need to convicting someone.
 3
   
It should be noted that, the studies reported here are not typical studies of moral 
judgment and reasoning, based on explicit verbal responses.  Rather, they may be 
understood to provide implicit judgments of culpability, which are not completely under 
conscious control and thus contrast with the more explicit or conscious measures of 
culpability (e.g., such as the explicit moral judgments or judgments as to which kinds of 
errors, false alarms or misses, are worse). Thus, to recapitulate the relevant findings: (1) 
all age groups judged the bad intended act as worse than the innocently intended act.  (2) 
But, when asked explicitly for an appropriate punishment, all but the youngest group 
judged the bad intended act as deserving of more punishment than the unintended act.  (3) 
Also, when asked which kind of error, false alarms or misses, are worse we did not 
obtain the previous shift from misses to no difference to false alarms with age regardless 
of the framing of the event.  (4) However, the shift from non-moral reasons to moral 
reasons (whether focusing on the danger of letting a guilty man go free to convicting an 
innocent man) was marked when comparing the youngest participants (7-9) to the other 
three age groups. Thus, different measures, more explicit or more implicit, elicit different 
responses and different effects of age and framing condition.   
The implications of these findings for the real-world of eyewitness identification 
are, in general, that the process of eyewitness identification is not independent of the 
moral nature of the crime or transgression, and, in particular, on whether the crime or 
transgression is framed or presented as due to the eyewitness’s intentions behind the act 
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and the severity of the outcome resulting from the act.  We believe that not only are these 
findings important for the study of the development of moral decision-making but they 
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Appendix: Computer Practice 
1. ‘Click the button that would tell me that you were very sure about something - like
your name’; 
2. ‘Click the button that would tell me that you are just a little bit less sure than the last
time’; 
3. ‘Click the button that would tell me how sure you are that today is Sunday’;
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Figure 1. .  Relationship between Bias 3 (C3) and age by condition. C3 = indicates the 
number of false alarms - misses, where a "very sure it is" counts as a positive 
identification. Higher Bias scores indicate fewer false alarms relative to misses, and 












Figure 2. Relationship between “How bad was the actor” and age by condition. (Where 1 = not 























Figure 3.Relationship between recommended punishment and age by condition. (Where 
1 = no punishment, 2 = community service/picking up trash on the highway, 3 = $5000 
fine, & 4 = 1-5 years in jail). 
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Figure 4. Moral Reasoning and age by condition. A higher score indicates a morally-
relevant response. 
